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INTRODUCTION

Mark Twain is believed to have remarked, “History doesn’t
repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” If you look for historical evidence
that Twain actually coined this maxim, you won’t find it. But like the
remark itself, the law often is more reflective of the echo that
resonates down through time than the original utterance.
This is an article about the evolution of a very specific and, to
be honest, obscure aspect of agricultural law: agricultural fence lines
in adverse possession claims. But this obscure topic occasionally
affects real people. Sometimes it affects generations of real people.
And in this particular story, the historical echo starts with a man
named Harry Kozak.
II. FENCE BUILDING WITH THE KOZAK FAMILY
A.

The Odd Fence on the Southwest 40

True to the spirit of Minnesota farmers, Harry Kozak was
industrious and practical about his operation in Sherburne County.1
He took care of his land,2 he sought to improve it,3 and he thought
about the future.4 In 1974, Harry expanded his farm by purchasing
an eighty-acre tract.5 He immediately set to work on it with the help
of his fourteen-year-old son, Rodney.6
This was a time before the widespread use of track vehicles,
before every (or any) farmer had a four-wheel-drive vehicle, and
before GPS or satellite imagery.7 Hands were the most effective tool.8
Harry tried to stay on his side of the property line and tried to
put up the new fences as close to this property line as possible.9 But
it was not always easy going.10 The Southwest 40 presented a
1. See generally Declaration of Rodney A. Kozak, Kozak v. Kozak, No. 71-CV15-1096 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 15, 2016).
2. Id.; see also Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, Kozak v. Kozak, No. 71-CV-15-1096 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 20,
2016).
3. Declaration of Rodney A. Kozak, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. Id. ¶ 4.
6. Id. ¶ 5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. ¶ 7.
10. Id.

374

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:2

particular challenge.11 There, Harry and young Rodney had to fight
their way through thick willows and reed canary hay.12
On the south fence line of the Southwest 40, Harry hit a snag.13
It was only when Harry finished the western fence (which runs north
to south) that he realized what had happened. There was a
significant amount of wire left on the western spool.14 The
premeasured wire was made to span exactly one side of a forty-acre
parcel, and leftovers could mean only one thing.15 The south fence
angled away diagonally from the southern property line.16
Just the same, the fence was meant to be installed near the
property line, but its purpose was not to mark the property line.17 An
angled fence keeps in sheep just as well as one that runs perfectly
perpendicular.18 The surrounding landowners of the Southwest
40—Harry’s brother Kermit to the north, Harold Cater to the west,
and Arthur “Bud” Cater to the south—knew that the fence lines did
not line up exactly with the boundaries.19 Nothing was formally
measured or surveyed, but this was the 1970s.20 They were neighbors,
some of them relatives. No one gave it much thought.21
The southern fence went through the toughest country on the
whole parcel.22 Bud Cater was a big man, over 300 pounds, and he
did not have reason, desire, or ability to go into the few acres of brush
and swamplands between his property line and the Kozak south
fence.23 He had about as little use for that kind of landscape as the
sheep.24 So the brand new south fence stayed where it was.25

11. Id. ¶ 5. The “Southwest 40” refers to the forty-acre parcel of land bordering
Harry Kozak’s southern property line. The southern edge of this parcel consists
mainly of marshland.
12. Id.
13. Id. ¶ 8.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. Id. ¶ 10.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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John Weis and Harry Kozak Clash over Adverse Possession

Years went by, and the diagonal fence on the Southwest 40 was
largely forgotten.26 Save for the keen interest of a youthful Rodney
during the deer hunting seasons of the 1970s and 80s, no one paid
much attention to the marshland between the southern fence and
the southern property line for a long time.27
But trouble was brewing on a different Kozak parcel.28 About a
mile away, in another township, Harry Kozak owned a parcel of land
next to another local farmer, John Weis.29 Between 1963 and 1967,
Harry, John, and Joe Weis (John’s father) agreed to build a fence
along their adjoining properties to prevent the comingling of their
cattle.30 Although it was built somewhat near the boundary, “[t]he
fence was not intended to mark the exact boundary line because [the
parties] did not know where it was.”31 After the fence was built, Harry
Kozak told John Weis that the fence was not in the right place to
mark the boundary line, but the parties decided to leave the fence
where it stood.32 Weis farmed up to the fence line on “his” side, and
both parties grazed cattle up to the fence line on their respective
sides.33
As part of a remonumentation project that began in 1974,
Sherburne County began replacing old section corner posts left by
the original government surveyors.34 Completed in 1981, this survey
made it appear as though the surveyed boundary line lay to the south

26. See id. ¶¶ 10–12.
27. See id.
28. See Weis v. Kozak, 410 N.W.2d 903 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
29. Id. at 904–05.
30. Id. at 905.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. “Remonumentation” is the process of replacing section markers. See
MINN. STAT. § 160.15 (2016). A “section” is an area that is normally one square mile.
Typically, thirty-six one-square-mile sections make up a township. Section markers
are placed at the intersecting corners of the sections on the grid to aid in land
surveying. Section markers may be made of a variety of materials, including, as is
often the case in rural Minnesota, stone or concrete posts or plates. See generally
George E. Leigh, Bottles, Pots, and Pans: Marking the Surveys of the U.S. Coast & Geodetic
Survey
and
NOAA,
NAT’L
OCEANIC
AND
ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN.,
http://www.ngs.noaa.gov/web/about_ngs/history/Survey_Mark_Art.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 14, 2016) (describing different types of survey markers used over the
last 200 years).
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and west of the Weis-Kozak fence line, which meant there was a
narrow strip of Kozak land of approximately two and one-half acres
on the Weis side of the fence.35
This did not sit well with Harry Kozak, particularly after John
Weis cut down a number of trees on the disputed acres.36 The KozakWeis boundary dispute was the subject of a lawsuit in the early 1980s,
in which the trial court directed a verdict against Harry Kozak at the
close of his case for failure to provide an independent survey of the
property.37 Harry Kozak appealed that case and lost.38 Subsequently,
a survey was obtained, showing that the property line did not align
with the fence line, and Harry Kozak brought a new quiet-title
action.39 Weis countered with a claim of adverse possession on the
disputed parcel, arguing in the alternative that the fence
represented “a boundary by practical location.”40 Harry won at the
trial court level, and, this time, Weis appealed.41
III. ESTABLISHING ADVERSE POSSESSION OR A BOUNDARY BY
PRACTICAL LOCATION
This article will circle back to the Kozaks and what their unique
family history has to do with Minnesota’s law of adverse possession.42
But first, it is important to develop an understanding of the legal
causes of action the Kozaks were up against.
In order to establish adverse possession under Minnesota law,
five elements must be present. Possession of the disputed property
must be (1) actual, (2) open, (3) hostile, (4) continuous, and (5)
exclusive.43 Moreover, “[m]ere possession is not enough to establish
title to land by adverse possession.”44 These elements must be
established “without resort to any inference or presumption in favor

35. Weis v. Kozak, 410 N.W.2d at 905.
36. See Kozak v. Weis, 348 N.W.2d 798, 799–800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
37. Id. at 800–01.
38. Id. at 803.
39. Weis v. Kozak, 410 N.W.2d at 905.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See infra Part III.
43. Johnson v. Raddohl, 226 Minn. 343, 345, 32 N.W.2d 860, 861 (1948)
(citing Romans v. Nadler, 217 Minn. 174, 177, 14 N.W.2d 482, 485 (1944)).
44. Id.
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of the disseizor, but with the indulgence of every presumption
against him.”45
Establishing a boundary by practical location is closely related
to a claim of adverse possession but differs in some respects.46 A
boundary by practical location may be established in one of three
ways: “(1) by acquiescence ‘for a sufficient length of time to bar a
right of entry under the statute of limitations’; (2) by an express
agreement of the parties claiming the land on both sides of the line
and then by acquiescence; or (3) by estoppel.”47
The statute of limitations for both adverse possession and
establishment of a boundary by practical location is fifteen years.48
In other words, to be victorious, the claimant of the land must have
adversely possessed the land, or, under the first method of
establishing the boundary by practical location, the parties must
have acquiesced in the practical location,49 for at least fifteen years.
The claimant who seeks to adversely possess a parcel of land
faces high evidentiary hurdles.50 Each of the five elements of adverse
possession must be shown for a period of at least fifteen years by clear
and convincing evidence.51 Likewise, establishing a boundary by
practical location under Minnesota law requires “clear, positive, and
unequivocal” evidence, which modern Minnesota courts have
interpreted as equivalent to a clear-and-convincing evidentiary
standard.52
45. Vill. of Newport v. Taylor, 225 Minn. 299, 303, 30 N.W.2d 588, 591 (1948).
46. Gabler v. Fedoruk, 756 N.W.2d 725, 728–29 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (citing
Benz v. City of St. Paul, 89 Minn. 31, 37, 93 N.W. 1038, 1039 (1903)) (noting that
“an action for the establishment of a boundary by practical location” is “like the
closely related action for adverse possession”). But see Denman v. Gans, 607 N.W.2d
788, 796 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Petition of Bldg. D, Inc., 502 N.W.2d 406,
408 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Petition of McGinnis, 536 N.W.2d 33, 35–36 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995)) (“Although the doctrine of practical location, at least in effect, is similar
to acquiring title by adverse possession, the two theories are distinct and require
proof of different elements.”).
47. Gabler, 756 N.W.2d at 729 (quoting Theros v. Phillips, 256 N.W.2d 852, 858
(Minn. 1977)).
48. See MINN. STAT. § 541.02 (2016).
49. See Theros, 256 N.W.2d at 858.
50. Ehle v. Prosser, 293 Minn. 183, 189, 197 N.W.2d 458, 462 (1972).
51. Id.
52. The language often cited by Minnesota courts as the legal standard for
establishing a boundary by practical location is that it requires “clear, positive, and
unequivocal” evidence; this language seems to have been carried over from late
nineteenth and early twentieth-century case law. See Benz v. City of St. Paul, 89 Minn.

378

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:2

A standard of proof assists the fact-finder in understanding “the
degree of confidence our society desires the fact-finder to have in
the correctness of his or her conclusions.”53 Most civil cases, of
course, only require proof by a preponderance of the evidence—a
standard under which the parties “share the risk of error in roughly
equal fashion.”54This standard is generally applied in civil litigation
because society has only “a ‘minimal concern’ with the outcome of
private suits.”55 It is an oversimplification, but when issue spotting in
real-life fact patterns, it is generally appropriate to equate fighting
over money with the preponderance of the evidence standard.56

31, 37, 93 N.W. 1038, 1039 (1903); Beardsley v. Crane, 52 Minn. 537, 546, 54 N.W.
740, 742 (1893). The “clear, positive, and unequivocal” language is still applied in
the twenty-first century as the evidentiary standard required to establish a boundary
by practical location in Minnesota. See, e.g., Pratt Inv. Co. v. Kennedy, 636 N.W.2d
844, 849 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). However, many contemporary Minnesota courts
make no distinction between “clear, positive, and unequivocal” evidence and the
“clear and convincing” evidentiary standard and thus simply apply the “clear and
convincing evidence” standard in establishing a boundary by practical location. See
Gabler, 756 N.W.2d at 729; Annett v. Snelling, No. C1-00-2084, 2001 WL 641763, at
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 12, 2001). Other jurisdictions have struggled with similar
language. See, e.g., Kruse v. Horlamus Indus., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Wis. 1986)
(holding that the phrase “evidence of possession must be clear and positive” does
not establish a higher standard to be used for the overall burden of proof but in fact
only refers to the quality of evidence which may even be considered). Minnesota
has not directly addressed, in a reported case, whether the “clear, positive, and
unequivocal” evidentiary requirement is equivalent to a “clear and convincing”
evidentiary standard, but a relatively recent unreported case in the court of appeals
found that the “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard is correctly applied to
establishing a boundary by practical location based on the “clear, positive, and
unequivocal” language. Potvin v. Hall, No. C4-99-421, 1999 WL 759983, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1999). Unlike some other states, Minnesota has absolutely
established a “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard for adverse possession and
has linked that cause of action closely to establishment of a boundary by practical
location. For practical purposes, it is likely safe to assume that a Minnesota court
will apply the clear and convincing evidentiary standard in deciding a claim of
boundary by practical location.
53. Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 773–74 (Minn. 2005) (citing
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
54. C.O. v. Doe, 757 N.W.2d 343, 353 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Addington, 441
U.S. at 423) (discussing the differences between the lowest “preponderance of the
evidence” standard, the higher “clear and convincing evidence” standard, and the
highest “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for criminal cases); see also Carrillo,
701 N.W.2d at 774.
55. C.O., 757 N.W.2d at 353 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 423).
56. See id.
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When a more abstract value interest is at stake—a person’s physical
or expressive freedom, or a person’s right to parent her child—a
higher standard of evidence is likely to be applied.57 Clear and
convincing evidence is a lower standard than the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard reserved for criminal cases,58 but the two
are certainly cousins.59 Because “[o]nly civil cases with ‘quasicriminal wrongdoing’ may use the clear and convincing standard,”
the interests at stake are more substantial than those at issue in a
typical civil case.60
Other types of civil cases to apply the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard include civil commitments (in some cases,
indefinite civil commitments), involuntary terminations of parental
rights, obtaining deportation orders, and revocation of citizenship.61
It is also telling which types of cases do not rise to the level of applying
the clear and convincing evidentiary standard.62 For example, it has
been repeatedly argued in Minnesota courts that civil fraud should
have to be proven by clear and convincing evidence as a quasicriminal action, as is required in some other jurisdictions; but
Minnesota courts have consistently rejected that argument and held
that the standard of proof—even in a fraud case—need not be
higher than preponderance of the evidence.63 Clear and convincing
evidence is a high standard.64
57. See State ex rel. Humphrey v. Alpine Air Prods., Inc., 500 N.W.2d 788, 791
(Minn. 1993).
58. State v. Miller, 754 N.W.2d 686, 701 (Minn. 2008) (citing State v. Kennedy,
585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998)); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769–
70 (1982) (discussing standard of proof for determining parental rights); Addington,
441 U.S. at 432–33 (discussing physical freedom).
59. See C.O., 757 N.W.2d at 353.
60. Id. (quoting Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 774 (Minn. 2005)).
61. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 179 (Minn. 1996) (noting that grounds for
commitment must be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence), vacated on
other grounds, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997), aff’d on remand, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999);
Humphrey, 500 N.W.2d at 791 (listing various legal actions that require clear and
convincing evidence); In re Welfare of Children of K.S.F., 823 N.W.2d 656, 663
(Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that the standard of proof in a termination of
parental rights proceeding is clear and convincing).
62. See Humphrey, 500 N.W.2d at 791 (holding that the standard in all fraud
cases is preponderance of the evidence).
63. See id. at 792 (stating that the Supreme Court uses the clear and convincing
standard for fraud cases).
64. See Vickery v. First Bank of LaCrosse, 368 N.W.2d 758, 763 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985).
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It makes some sense for the clear and convincing evidence
standard to be applied to adverse possession claims. While a dollar
value can be assigned to a piece of real property, an adverse
possession claim is not about owing money. Land is not fungible, like
money. The law assumes that every piece of realty is unique.65 In the
western legal tradition, there has long been something sacrosanct
about one’s own land or home. And adverse possession is unlike
eminent domain, where the enumerated and carefully checked
power of the state is applied, on behalf of the common good, to
retain a piece of land only with just compensation provided.66 No,
the would-be adverse possessor seizes something unique and special,
under no legal claim of right, offering nothing in return; if that
seizure is to stand, the law requires at the least a damn strong
showing that he should keep it.
A.

Actual, Open, Hostile, Continuous, and Exclusive Possession

The clear and convincing evidentiary standard is the lens
through which each of the elements to adverse possession must be
viewed.67 There is some overlap, but each element must be proven
by clear and convincing evidence for the disseizor to win the day.68
A failure on any one element will render the entire claim defective.69
The first element is actual possession.70 Actual possession is the
occupation of the disputed land in a sufficiently weighty fashion. The
obvious part of actual possession is some sort of physical imposition
on the property,71 but there is a more metaphysical aspect of actual
65. Mellin v. Woolley, 103 Minn. 498, 499–500, 115 N.W. 654, 655 (1908)
(stating that land is a “unique thing, not capable of being duplicated”).
66. See Barmel v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist., 201 Minn. 622, 624, 277
N.W. 208, 209 (1938) (“Of course our Constitution limits the right of eminent
domain to the taking of private property for public use with just compensation
therefor first paid or secured.”).
67. Miller v. Martin, 259 Minn. 177, 178, 106 N.W.2d 549, 550 (Minn. 1960)
(explaining that a clear and convincing standard applies to each element of adverse
possession).
68. Ehle v. Prosser, 293 Minn. 183, 189, 197 N.W.2d 458, 462 (Minn. 1972).
69. See id. at 189, 197 N.W.2d at 462.
70. See Washburn v. Cutter, 17 Minn. 361 (1871) (holding that actual or
constructive possession of land is required).
71. Fredericksen v. Henke, 167 Minn. 356, 359, 209 N.W. 257, 258 (1926)
(stating that the adverse possessor does not have to live on the disputed property,
but the land must be “occupied and applied to the uses for which it is fit”); Wallace
v. Sache, 106 Minn. 123, 124, 118 N.W. 360, 361 (1908) (“‘Actual possession’ means
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possession as well. Not every physical intrusion onto land implies
actual possession of that land. For example, in Minnesota, cultivation
of agricultural land constitutes sufficient actual possession, but it is
an open question as to whether pasturing livestock suffices, and
different jurisdictions have come to different conclusions.72
The open possession requirement, the second element, could
be described as making the fact of actual possession known—the
disseizor keeping their “flag flying,” as many courts have pithily
described it.73 A significant part of this requirement is line-of-sight
visibility.74 Courts, although finding adverse possession on a portion
of a property, have denied it for want of openness on another
portion of the same property upon finding that a wooded area
obscured the disseizor’s activities.75 Openness can certainly come
into play based on the physical features of a given piece of
farmland.76 But within the context of fence lines, there is little to say
on openness. In Minnesota at least, agricultural fences generally
consist of a few strands of barbed wire, a humming electrified strand,
or waist-high chicken wire—none of which are typically effective as
instruments of concealment.77 A fence itself would only affect the
openness factor if it hid what was on the other side—perhaps a feat
accomplishable by a Trumpian border fence, but not the typical
Holstein enclosure.
As for the third element, the hostility requirement refers “to the
intention of the disseizor to claim exclusive ownership as against the
world and to treat the property in dispute in a manner generally
associated with the ownership of similar type property in the
particular area involved,” rather than to “personal animosity or
physical overt acts against the record owner of the property.”78 In
other words, the disseizor must treat the property as his own as
the corporeal detention of the property when used in relation to adverse
possession.”).
72. Weis v. Kozak, 410 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
73. Ganje v. Schuler, 659 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting
Romans v. Nadler, 217 Minn. 174, 178, 14 N.W.2d 482, 485 (1944)); see also Dean v.
Goddard, 55 Minn. 290, 297, 56 N.W. 1060, 1062 (1893).
74. See Ganje, 659 N.W.2d at 267.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See MINN. STAT. § 344.02 (2016); see also SAM RANKIN & GARY CURRIE, MINN.
H.R.
RESEARCH
DEP’T,
MINN.
PARTITION
FENCE
LAW
(1998),
www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/fencelaw.
78. Ehle v. Prosser, 293 Minn. 183, 190, 197 N.W.2d 458, 462 (1972).
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though he had title, given how one would expect the title owner of
the given type of property to treat it.79 This is sometimes phrased
similarly to the exclusivity element: evincing an intention to exclude
all others.80 But that does not mean a successful disseizor has to
spend fifteen years chasing the title owners off the land with a rolling
pin. Attempting to keep everyone off the adversely possessed
property is not the key; instead, the key is keeping anyone else from
using the property in the manner in which a fee owner would be expected
to use that property, given the type of property it is.81 For example, on
a residential property, enclosing parts of the fee owner’s lot with a
fence, occupying the interior of that fence, and occupying a portion
of the lot with an encroaching garage are hostile acts; these acts
preclude the fee owner from making similar residential use of the
property.82 In the agricultural context, hostile possession means
putting the land to farming uses at the exclusion of the fee owner
for purposes like the “grazing of cattle and sheep, building and
maintaining fences, removing gravel, quarry[ing] rock and
[removing] trees, and engaging in certain conservation practices on
the land.”83 Rather than demanding this element fit in a single
definition, “[h]ostility is flexibly determined by examining ‘the
character of the possession and the acts of ownership of the
occupant.’”84
A special note on the element of hostility is warranted to address
permissive use. By definition, use that is permissive cannot be
characterized as hostile.85 Further, “[w]here the original entry is
permissive, the statute does not begin to run against the legal owner
until an adverse holding is declared and notice of such change is
brought to the knowledge of the owner.”86 To state it another way, a
claimant who possesses land by the permission of the title holder
does not get to start the fifteen-year clock on adverse possession until
making it clear to the title holder, whether through express
affirmation or through the character of the circumstances, that such

79. Ganje, 659 N.W.2d at 268.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. See Romans v. Nadler, 217 Minn. 174, 178, 14 N.W.2d 482, 485 (1944).
83. Grubb v. State, 433 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
84. Ebenhoh v. Hodgman, 642 N.W.2d 104, 110–11 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)
(quoting Carpenter v. Coles, 75 Minn. 9, 11, 77 N.W. 424, 424 (1898)).
85. See Meyers v. Meyers, 368 N.W.2d 391, 393 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
86. Johnson v. Raddohl, 226 Minn. 343, 345, 32 N.W.2d 860, 861 (1948).
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possession has become hostile.87 And, “proof of inception of hostility
must in all cases be clear and unequivocal.”88 The same standards
that govern a showing of hostility outlined above may transform
permissive possession into hostile possession, but they must be
clearly and unequivocally shown.89 As a practical matter, a court is
likely to apply a healthy degree of skepticism to any allegations of
hostile intent when possession began as permissive.90 Silence from
the disseizor is not enough to declare hostile intent, and the title
owner’s abandonment of the property is similarly ineffectual as
evidence of hostile intent on the part of the would-be disseizor.91 The
title owner must be affirmatively notified of intent to hold the
property adverse to her title, whether through words or action, in
order to dislodge permissive use from continuing as permissive.92
“When use of property begins as permissive, the continued use is also
deemed permissive until the contrary is affirmatively shown.”93
Continuous possession, the fourth element, is exactly what it
sounds like; the other elements have been maintained, without
interruption, for the statutory period of fifteen years.94 A successive
occupant may tack together time from herself and her predecessor
to make the requisite period if there is privity between them.95
However, “[o]ccasional and sporadic trespasses,” even when they
continue throughout the statutory period, are not enough to satisfy
the continuity requirement.96
87. Id. at 345, 32 N.W.2d at 861–62.
88. Id. at 345, 32 N.W.2d at 862.
89. Meyers, 368 N.W.2d at 393–94.
90. See id.; Raddohl, 226 Minn. at 345, 32 N.W.2d at 861.
91. See Meyers, 368 N.W.2d at 393–94.
92. See Omodt v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 106 Minn. 205, 207, 118 N.W.
798, 799 (1908); Pickar v. Erickson, 382 N.W.2d 536, 539 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
93. Weis v. Kozak, 410 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (citation
omitted).
94. See Romans v. Nadler, 217 Minn. 174, 177–78, 14 N.W.2d 482, 485 (1944).
The plaintiff or the plaintiff’s predecessor must have maintained the fifteen years
of continuity in order to maintain the action. MINN. STAT. § 541.02 (2016). But see
Olson v. Burk, 94 Minn. 456, 458, 103 N.W. 335, 336 (1905) (“In order that adverse
possession may ripen into title, there must be continuity of the adverse possession
for the full statutory period. An acknowledgment by the adverse claimant of the
owner’s title before the statute has run in his favor breaks the continuity of his
adverse possession, and it cannot be tacked to any subsequent adverse possession.”).
95. See Ford Consumer Fin. Co. v. Carlson & Breese, Inc., 611 N.W.2d 75, 77
(Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
96. They also fail to satisfy the requirement of hostility. Romans, 217 Minn. at
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Exclusive possession is the fifth and final element of adverse
possession. Possession must be made with the intent to exclude
others, and this intent can be inferred from the use of the land.97
Exclusive possession does not necessarily mean that the disseizors
have to specifically act to exclude others from the land, such as by
posting “No Trespass” signs or the like.98 But there is no exclusivity
if the title holders are still using the land.99 Note, though, that entries
by others which are only “brief and insubstantial” do not affect the
exclusive character of the disseizors’ possession.100
B.

Boundary by Practical Location Through Acquiescence, Express
Agreement of the Parties and Acquiescence, or Estoppel

In any two-count complaint from a prospective disseizor,
boundary by practical location is the natural counterpart to adverse
possession.101 Establishing a boundary by practical location still
requires high evidentiary standards, as discussed above.102 But in
contrast to adverse possession, the location of an agricultural fence
line is of much more practical relevance.
Yet, even in establishing a boundary by practical location, the
fence itself is of very limited use without clear evidence of the
surrounding circumstances.103 The first way to establish a boundary
by practical location is acquiescence alone for the statutory period

178, 14 N.W.2d at 485.
97. Fredericksen v. Henke, 167 Minn. 356, 359, 209 N.W. 257, 258 (1926)
(“Adverse or hostile intent may be inferred from the character of the possession.”);
Ganje v. Schuler, 659 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that intent
to take the land is not necessary, but intent to exclude others is).
98. See, e.g., Houdek v. Guyse, No. A04-711, 2005 WL 406217, at *2 (Minn. Ct.
App. Feb. 22, 2005).
99. See Ganje, 659 N.W.2d at 267 (“[There was no exclusive possession in area
from which both parties took wood], transplanted wild flowers, trimmed the lilacs,
allowed their children to play, and otherwise ‘took advantage of the opportunity
provided by the area.’”).
100. Ebenhoh v. Hodgman, 642 N.W.2d 104, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
101. See Gabler v. Fedoruk, 756 N.W.2d 725, 728–29 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008)
(stating that an action for adverse possession is “closely related” to an action to
establish boundary by practical location).
102. See supra Part II.
103. See, e.g., Wojahn v. Johnson, 297 N.W.2d 298, 305 (Minn. 1980) (finding a
fence that was deteriorating and in disrepair at various times in the past was of little
use in establishing a boundary by practical location in consideration of conflicting
testimony regarding the purpose of the fence).

2017]

FENCE LINES AND ADVERSE POSSESSION

385

of fifteen years.104 Acquiescence is not just accepting the existence of
a fence, a tree line, or some other kind of physical boundary.105
Acquiescence is agreeing, either “affirmatively or tacitly,” that the
physical boundary created by the fence or other demarcation is the
actual boundary.106 It “is not merely passive consent to the existence
of a fence . . . but rather is conduct or lack thereof from which assent
to the fence . . . as a boundary line may be reasonably inferred.”107
For instance, where parties jointly built a fence and attempted and
intended to place the fence as near to the dividing line of their farms
as possible and thereafter accepted the fence in question as the
boundary line, there would be a strong inference of a boundary by
practical location.108 On the other hand, “a pasture fence built by
one on his own land, the careless, irregular course of which
indicated that the builder did not intend it as a true boundary line,
ought not to be relied on by an adjacent landowner, who had
nothing to do with its construction, location, or use as a division line
by acquiescence.”109
A boundary by practical location that is the result of express
agreement of the parties is similar to the simple acquiescence
method.110 The big difference is that with the former, there must be
an express agreement between the parties as to the location of the
true boundary line.111 This does not have to be a formal agreement,
but there must be at least a mutual and specific discussion identifying
the boundary line.112 The other difference is that where there is an
express agreement, the acquiescence does not necessarily have to be
for the full statutory period of fifteen years for the boundary by
practical location to be effective.113

104. Gabler, 756 N.W.2d at 729.
105. See Wojahn, 297 N.W.2d at 304.
106. Gabler, 756 N.W.2d at 729; see LeeJoice v. Harris, 404 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987).
107. Wojahn, 297 N.W.2d at 305 (quoting Engquist v. Wirtjes, 243 Minn. 502,
507–08, 68 N.W.2d 412, 417 (1955)).
108. Engquist, 243 Minn. at 508, 68 N.W.2d at 417.
109. Id.
110. See Ruikkie v. Nall, 798 N.W.2d 806, 818 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011).
111. Id.
112. Id.; see also Slindee v. Fritch Invs., LLC, 760 N.W.2d 903, 910 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2009).
113. Ruikkie, 798 N.W.2d at 818 (“[B]ecause this agreement is not an actual
contract, acquiescence in the agreed-upon boundary must be for a substantial
period of time, although not necessarily the full 15 years required under the
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Finally, establishing a boundary by practical location through
estoppel requires that the title holder knew the true location of the
boundary line, but “silently looked on . . . while the other party
encroached thereon or subjected himself to expense which he would
not have incurred had the line been in dispute.”114 The classic
imagery of an estoppel situation is the chuckling neighbor rocking
back and forth in his front-porch chair, sipping a cup of coffee,
watching the hapless to-be disseizor putting up a garage bisected by
the true property line.
IV. REVISITING THE KOZAKS
A.

Weis v. Kozak in the Court of Appeals

Harry Kozak probably did not give much (or any) thought to
the elements of adverse possession when he was running his farm.
Harry just wanted a court to confirm that his land was, in fact, his
land.115 But the mantle of history is often advanced by unwitting
participants. In seeking his confirmation, and defending it in the
court of appeals, Harry created a precedent in Minnesota that
contained a singular example of adverse possession law as it pertains
to the location of a fence.116
John Weis’s claim of actual possession of the Kozak land on his
side of the fence relied upon his farming of the disputed land.117
While the court of appeals readily acknowledged that cultivation

acquiescence theory.”); see also Houston Cty. v. Burns, 126 Minn. 206, 208, 148 N.W.
115, 115 (1914) (allowing a claim for acquiescence to an agreed-upon boundary
almost ten years following survey and establishment of a fence); Beardsley v. Crane,
52 Minn. 537, 547, 54 N.W. 740, 743 (1893) (allowing a claim for acquiescence to
an agreed-upon boundary nine years following survey and establishment of the
fence).
114. Theros v. Phillips, 256 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Minn. 1977) (citations omitted).
A boundary by practical location arising through estoppel typically involves the
erection of a building that encroaches over the true boundary line; it should be
noted that the title holder “can be estopped only from asserting title to the prejudice
and injury of plaintiff,” meaning that the boundary can only be extended through
estoppel to the portion of the lot on which the building actually encroaches. Benz
v. City of St. Paul, 89 Minn. 31, 40, 93 N.W. 1038, 1040 (1903).
115. See Weis v. Kozak, 410 N.W.2d 903, 904 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
116. See id.; see generally 82 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 227 Proof of Boundary
Established by Parol Agreement or by Acquiescence of Adjoining Landowners (Westlaw,
database updated Apr. 2017).
117. See Weis, 410 N.W.2d at 905.
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constituted sufficient use to satisfy the requirements of adverse
possession, it seemed that the disputed land, or at least a significant
portion of it, was not cultivated by Weis, but only served as grazing
land for his cattle.118 To date, no reported Minnesota case has
directly addressed whether grazing cattle alone serves as actual
possession for purposes of adverse possession.119 Some jurisdictions
have held that pasturing livestock is sufficient possession, and others
have held the opposite.120 The Kozak court also paid homage to the
third group of states: those that found that it “depends upon the
surrounding circumstances” of the pasturing of livestock.121 At any rate,
the court of appeals gave Weis the benefit of an assumption that he
had proven actual possession.122
The remaining elements of adverse possession received
relatively little attention in Weis v. Kozak.123 This was not because
these elements were unimportant. But the adverse possession claim
in Weis v. Kozak was based on little more than the physical location
of a fence.124 “Aside from the location of the fence built by both
parties, there [was] no evidence Weis claimed ownership of the
property.”125 The parties, while they jointly agreed to build the fence,
did so to keep their cattle apart, not to designate a boundary line.126
Kozak explicitly “told Weis the fence ‘wasn’t in the right place,’” and
the parties agreed to leave it because of expense—an indicator of
permissive, rather than hostile, use.127 And when Kozak moved part
of the fence in 1972 further onto the land Weis would subsequently
claim, Weis made no effort to exclude him.128 Ultimately, there was
“no evidence Weis communicated an adverse intent to Kozak or
occupied the property in an attempt to claim it as his own.”129
Neither did Weis get much traction in establishing a boundary
by practical location. The court found that “[t]he evidence show[ed]
that neither party attempted nor intended to build the fence on the
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See id. at 905–06.
See id. at 906.
See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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boundary line.”130 Rather, the evidence showed that the purpose of
the fence was to separate cattle.131 There was certainly no express
agreement between the parties as to the location of the boundary
line, nor was there reliance on the fence as a boundary line, as
evidenced by the acknowledgments that it was not on the line and
that Kozak moved part of the fence in 1972.132
Weis v. Kozak was not the first, nor the most recent, but is
perhaps the clearest case in Minnesota to say it: the sole existence of
a fence does not make an adverse possession claim.133 Harry kept his
land.134
B.

A New Generation of Kozaks Go Back to the Southwest 40—To Argue
About Adverse Possession

Harry Kozak created a bit of a legacy for his family name in
defending title to his farmland against John Weis. As of the date of
this writing, fourteen cases in the Minnesota Court of Appeals have
cited to Weis v. Kozak.135 The case offers something to practitioners
130. Id. at 907.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.; see also Engquist v. Wirtjes, 243 Minn. 502, 505, 68 N.W.2d 412, 415
(1955) (“[I]t is obvious that the erection of a fence by an adjoining landowner has
little significance on the issue of adverse possession unless the disseizor uses and
occupies the land up to the line established by the fence.”); Ebenhoh v. Hodgman,
642 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Engquist, 243 Minn. at 505, 68
N.W.2d at 415) (“[T]he erection of a fence by an adjoining landowner has little
significance on the issue of adverse possession unless the disseizor uses and occupies
the land up to the line established by the fence.”).
134. Weis v. Kozak, 410 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
135. As of the date of this writing, fourteen cases in the Minnesota Court of
Appeals have cited to Weis v. Kozak: Ebenhoh v. Hodgman, 642 N.W.2d 104 (2002);
Pratt Inv. Co. v. Kennedy, 636 N.W.2d 844 (2001); Quast v. Brose, No. C7-00-2025,
2001 WL 1035039 (Sept. 11, 2001); Annett v. Snelling, No. C1-00-2084, 2001 WL
641763 (June 12, 2001); Berbee v. Rimas, No. C7-00-209, 2000 WL 1468144 (Oct. 3,
2000); Denman v. Gans, 607 N.W.2d 788 (2000); Jacobsen v. Salin, No. C7-99-980,
1999 WL 1216831 (Dec. 21, 1999); Potvin v. Hall, No. C4-99-421, 1999 WL 759983
(Sept. 28, 1999); Brooten v. Mykleby, No. C4-98-795, 1999 WL 10254 (Jan 12, 1999);
Jones v. Cullen, No. CX-98-1269, 1998 WL 811558 (Nov. 24, 1998); Kvaal v. Porter,
No. CX-97-1049, 1998 WL 217192 (May 5, 1998); Friesen v. Droneck, No. C4-961991, 1997 WL 228970 (May 6, 1997); Application of Oldenburg, No. C9-92-1752,
1993 WL 89664 (Mar. 30, 1993); Bonanza Grain, Inc. v. Roverud Const., Inc., No.
C8-92-1287, 1993 WL 52173 (Mar. 2, 1993). See Weis, 410 N.W.2d. 903 (showing
fourteen cases from the Minnesota Court of Appeals in the “Citing References” tab
on Westlaw as of December 22, 2016).
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as well as judges. The most poignant lesson of Weis v. Kozak, distilled
into its purest form, is relatively simple: throw away the existence of
a fence, and if you still have an adverse possession claim, by all means
pursue it. But this lesson is not being absorbed quickly by the legal
profession, nor the Kozak family.
Remember the Southwest 40, where a teenage Rodney Kozak
stalked deer in the swampland surrounding a diagonal fence line?
Well, Rodney grew up.136 And his aging parents had new neighbors
to the south.137 The fence no longer angled away from the boundary
with the affable Arthur Cater; it angled away from the boundary with
Pamela Kozak, Rodney’s cousin.138 Pamela Kozak harbored a far
keener interest in the pie slice of land between the south fence and
the boundary than Arthur Cater had.
To clarify, Pamela Kozak obtained title to what had been Arthur
Cater’s property in 1989.139 At that time, and for a number of years
afterward, Rodney continued his habit of deer hunting on his
parents’ land in the strip between the south fence and the southern
boundary line separating his parents’ property and the property now
belonging to Pamela Kozak.140
But Rodney Kozak and Pamela (not to mention her husband)
did not see eye-to-eye on a number of matters.141 One of these
matters was the use of the land south of the angled fence during
hunting season.142 Tension between the families rose, and much of
it found an outlet in the simmering turf war over the hunting use of
the disputed strip.
In 1997, Rodney Kozak helped his parents obtain a formal
survey for the Southwest 40.143 The next year, after some substantial
legal wrangling, where Pamela Kozak first raised the specter of an
adverse possession claim, Pamela and her uncle Harry Kozak (along
with their respective spouses) signed a succinct agreement whereby
the parties explicitly recognized that the location of the south fence

136. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment at 2, Kozak v. Kozak, No. 71-CV-15-1096 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 31, 2016).
137. See id. at 3.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Declaration of Rodney A. Kozak, supra note 1, ¶ 11.
141. Id. ¶ 12.
142. Id.
143. Id. ¶ 11.
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was not on the common boundary line.144 The Kozaks agreed that
when the fence needed to be replaced or “significantly repaired,” it
would be moved to the surveyed boundary line and the expense
would be shared between the parties.145 In the agreement, the parties
waived “any claim which they may have against each other regarding
the current location of the fence.”146 The agreement was to run with
the land and would thus bind the parties as well as their successors.147
Shortly after the signing of the 1998 agreement, Rodney
acquired the Southwest 40 from his parents.148 Having been involved
in the process that birthed the 1998 agreement, and as the one who
had hunted on the disputed territory for decades, Rodney was well
aware of the circumstances he bought into. With the fully executed
1998 agreement in hand, Rodney decided not to invite further
conflict.149 He stopped hunting the strip of land between the fence
and the boundary line.150
Rodney continued to stay off the strip of land south of his fence,
although he kept paying the property taxes on it.151 He told his
cousin Pamela that she and her family could use that strip to hunt,
and they did.152 They also used it for four-wheeling, as did Rodney’s
sons during high school when they were friendly with Pamela’s
son.153 Rodney continued to use the southern fence as a barrier to
keep in livestock, and he continued to perform maintenance on the
fence as necessary for that purpose.154
But adding a “piece of wire here and there” can only keep a
fence with wooden posts going for so long.155 By 2015, some forty
years had passed since the fence’s construction. Parts of the south
fence were completely derelict.156 Rodney hired a contractor to get
an estimate as to the cost of replacing the fence and, while they were
inspecting it, discovered that some attempts at repair had been made
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. Ex. B.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also id. Ex. C.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 13.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id.
Id. ¶ 15.
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by another party.157 After this, Rodney sought compliance with the
1998 agreement, desiring that he and his cousin rebuild the south
fence at shared expense, this time at the actual surveyed property
line.158 However, Pamela Kozak had other ideas.
Knowing that he was facing an adverse possession claim from
Pamela, Rodney brought an action to determine adverse claims
under Minnesota Statutes section 559.01.159 He also sued for breach
of contract for failure to honor the 1998 agreement and for
declaratory relief finding the 1998 agreement enforceable as a
matter of law.160
Pamela counterclaimed, alleging slander of title.161 The parties
exchanged discovery and conducted depositions on both Rodney
and Pamela. Then, something unexpected happened. Pamela
moved for summary judgment that as a matter of law she owned the
disputed strip on the basis of adverse possession and the
establishment of a boundary by practical location.162
Only when there is no dispute as to any material fact, and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, can a party be
granted summary judgment.163 In addition to the various
presumptions against parties claiming adverse possession or a
boundary by practical location and the high evidentiary standard
they have to meet,164 Pamela’s motion added another hurdle on top
of these presumptions. At summary judgment, all evidence must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom
judgment is sought.165
The textbook way to defeat a summary judgment motion is to
convince the court that there is a material issue of fact, which cannot
be decided at summary judgment but must be deferred for
consideration by a fact-finder at trial.166 There is an overwhelming
157. Id.
158. Complaint at 3, Kozak v. Kozak, No. 71-CV-15-1096 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct.
14, 2015).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 4.
161. Answer and Counterclaim ¶¶ 28–31, Kozak v. Kozak, No. 71-CV-15-1096
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Nov. 23, 2015).
162. See generally Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 136, at 2.
163. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 56.03.
164. See supra Part II.
165. Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993).
166. See Sauter v. Sauter, 244 Minn. 482, 485, 70 N.W.2d 351, 353 (Minn. 1955)
(“[A] summary judgment is proper where there is no issue to be tried but is wholly

392

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:2

abundance of Minnesota case law holding that the existence of
adverse possession, or a boundary line by practical location, is a fact
issue to be resolved at trial.167 Practically, this means that one
claiming adverse possession or a boundary by practical location
virtually cannot win at summary judgment, as “any doubt . . . as to
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact . . . must be resolved
in favor of finding that the fact issue exists.”168 Were the proper
standard applied, the title holder opposing adverse possession would
have to concede to every allegation underlying each element of the
disseizor’s claim to lose at summary judgment.169
As if all of this was not enough, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has established a further inference against adverse possession by a
close family member: “[T]he existence of a close family relationship
between the claimant of land and the record owner . . . created the
inference, if not the presumption, that the original possession by the
claimant of the other’s land was permissive and not adverse . . . .”170
This inference probably applies when an adverse claimant is a first
cousin to a title holder, if they have a close relationship—although
it will not act to negate the existence of clearly hostile use.171 Much
more could be said regarding the inference against adverse
possession by a family member and whether or not it was applicable
on the Kozaks’ facts; suffice it to say, the inference provided a little
more force behind the several damaging stakes already protruding
from the heart of Pamela Kozak’s summary judgment motion.
erroneous where there is a genuine issue to try.”).
167. See, e.g., Wojahn v. Johnson, 297 N.W.2d 298, 303 (Minn. 1980) (“A trial
court determination as to a disputed boundary is one of fact . . . .” (citation
omitted)); Stevens v. Velde, 138 Minn. 59, 61, 163 N.W. 796, 796 (1917) (“Usually
the question whether the elements essential to adverse possession exist is one of
fact.”); Slindee v. Fritch Invs., LLC, 760 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009)
(“[A] boundary determination involves a fact issue . . . .”); Ganje v. Schuler, 659
N.W.2d 261, 266 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“Whether the adverse possession elements
have been established is a question of fact.” (citation omitted)); Denman v. Gans,
607 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (“[T]he question of adverse possession
is for the fact finder, whether it be the jury or the court.”).
168. Rathbun v. W.T. Grant Co., 300 Minn. 233, 230, 219 N.W.2d 641, 646
(1974).
169. See id.
170. Norgong v. Whitehead, 225 Minn. 379, 383, 31 N.W.2d 267, 269 (1948)
(citation omitted).
171. See Ebenhoh v. Hodgman, 642 N.W.2d 104, 112 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)
(noting that a property transfer between close family members does not render
permissive otherwise hostile possession).
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For the readers keeping score, there are a few things at play in
the motion. First, there is a movant in summary judgment who bears
the highest burden of proof that exists in civil cases. Second, there is
a binding Minnesota Court of Appeals case, involving the same
family, that says the location of a fence—admitted by all parties to
have been built to keep in livestock and not to mark a boundary line
and admitted by all parties not to lie on the surveyed boundary
line—is not of evidentiary use to a disseizor. Third, there is a
presumption that permissive use continues as permissive, which is
strengthened both by the inference that familial use begins as
permissive and an assertion in this case by the title holder that use
by the disseizor or her predecessor, if any, was permissive. Fourth,
there is the summary judgment standard requiring that all facts be
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, decisive case
law saying that resolving these claims requires fact-finding, and a
number of factual allegations which would defeat the claims if true.
Fifth, there is the fully executed 1998 agreement, in which the
movant acknowledged that the fence was not on the true boundary
line and waived any claim she had in regards to the current location
of the fence. Sixth and last, there is a complete lack of Minnesota
precedent speaking to whether or not hunting and four-wheeling on
a piece of land could even rise to the level of possession sufficient to
support an adverse possession claim.172
Pamela filed a memorandum in support of her summary
judgment motion,173 Rodney filed a memorandum in opposition,174
and the case settled before the district court made a ruling.175 The
settlement was confidential.176 It was a bit of an anti-climactic
conclusion to a family legal saga four decades in the making.
At first blush, Kozak v. Kozak is a little deflating. Legal issues,
seemingly put to rest thirty years prior, rose from the grave to once
again haunt the same family, only to yawn and return to the ground.
But maybe there is a lesson to be garnered along the journey from
Weis v. Kozak to Kozak v. Kozak. And perhaps, for the optimist, there
is even indicia of momentum toward progress.
172. See Complaint, supra note 158, at 2–5.
173. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 136.
174. See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, supra note 2. In the interests of academic integrity by way of
full disclosure, it is important to note that the author wrote this memorandum.
175. The author has personal knowledge of this case’s resolution.
176. Id.
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V. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE KOZAK CASES FOR PRACTITIONERS,
JUDGES, AND LAWMAKERS
First, it is worth noting that, despite this author’s (admittedly
biased) perspective that Pamela Kozak’s summary judgment motion
was dead in the water from a legal standpoint, it may have had some
value to her. The case did settle. The claims, long shots though they
may have been at a summary judgment, helped resolve a controversy,
which is the purpose of a trial in the first place.177 Perhaps they could
have even conceivably been successful with the right judge; a fence
is powerful as a concept.
This article started by remarking on the obscurity of this
particular topic area. Most laypeople, and many lawyers, have not the
faintest clue about the precise legal effect the location of a fence line
has on an adverse possession claim. Yet, the same laypeople, and the
same lawyers, universally have some notion knocking around in the
back of their heads that, if a person squats on a piece of land long
enough, it becomes their own. Adverse possession is a historical
doctrine, and it is not surprising that it has, at least superficially,
seeped into the cultural awareness of every landowner in America.
Readers following along closely have ascertained this author’s
opinion as to the effect the location of a fence line has on an adverse
possession claim—namely, none. The existence of a fence does
nothing to show actual, open, hostile, continuous, or exclusive
possession of land on either side of the fence, except to the extent
that some such use may occur up to the fence itself. Of course,
whether the fence existed or not, such use up to the same line would
be just as actual, open, hostile, continuous, and exclusive.
The existence of a fence is slightly more helpful to a claim of
boundary by practical location, but not much.178 A landowner
acquiescing or agreeing, through words or actions, to the location of
a boundary different from the surveyed lines should be just as
susceptible to a claim of boundary by practical location if that line is
marked by a fence, an electrical wire, a stand of trees, a line in the
sand, or nothing at all.179 A boundary by practical location through

177. Not to “search for truth,” as a wise former professor of this author was fond
of saying when reminding students to review Article III principles.
178. See Ganje v. Schuler, 659 N.W.2d 261, 270 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing a
fence line and a roadway as indicia of a boundary line dispute).
179. Adjacent landowners jointly maintaining a fence is one of the better
examples of how a fence might be useful in establishing a boundary by practical
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estoppel, which perhaps presents the best equitable argument for a
disseizor, could conceivably receive aid from the existence of a fence
if the claimant alleged to have incurred significant expense
upgrading the fence itself; other than this, it is hard to imagine an
estoppel claim dependent on a fence line.
The existence of a fence, with nothing more, should neither
help nor hurt an adverse possession claimant from a legal
standpoint. So why does it keep coming up, again and again over
more than a hundred years, as a focal point of many of these cases?
Because it is a fence. It is a tangible—the tangible—archetypal concept
of a “boundary.” People see a fence, and the immediate thought is
that one is not supposed to be on the other side. Fences keep things
in, and they keep things out. They separate things. Intangible legal
property boundaries do the same, except it is simply the claim of
right that keeps things in and keeps things out instead of a physical
barrier. This article makes no claim to expertise in psychology, but
it is easy to see how people could perceive the physical utility of a
fence as be inextricably intertwined with the legal utility of a
property line.
Not surprisingly, there is little empirical evidence to support this
author’s suspicion that the mental association between fences and
boundary lines leads to legal mistakes. But anyone who has hunted
in rural Minnesota during deer season can attest to the innumerable
squabbles that arise between landowners similarly situated to Rodney
and Pamela Kozak and the central role the location of a decades-old
fence plays in many of them. People tend to believe that what is on
“their” side of a fence is “theirs.” And it is not only laypeople who are
susceptible to this bias. Lawyers, and even judges, can get it wrong.
In the ideal world, the concepts of physical and legal barriers
would dissociate, and the knowledge that the location of a fence line
does not equal the location of a property line would diffuse amongst
the property owners of Minnesota. In an only slightly more realistic
world, lawyers would be sufficiently familiar with Weis v. Kozak, its
forebears, and its progeny to properly advise their clients as the
clouds darken over a fence-related boundary dispute. But in the real
world, this is an obscure legal topic. In the real world, lawyers who

location, because it tends to show that each side is treating the fence as the property
of both and therefore as a demarcation of the boundary line; joint maintenance,
however, is still no more than evidence of an agreement about the location of the
property line, and it is the agreement, not the fence, that makes the line effective.
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are typically taking agricultural adverse possession cases have a
variety of other practice areas to keep up on.
Looking forward, someday, the continuing advance of
technology may very well moot the need for the legal precedent on
this issue. Today, there is GPS. Unlike in Harry Kozak’s era, there are
four-wheel-drive vehicles in every farmer’s shed, and there is satellite
imagery available at the touch of a button.180 As old fences are
replaced and new fences are built, fences intended to exactly mark
a boundary line are more likely than ever before to actually mark
that boundary line. On the other hand, if a fence is built for some
other reason, it is more likely than ever before that the landowner
will be aware that the fence does not align with a legal boundary line.
Still, despite the current wondrous age of technology, there are a lot
of fences still going up today in rural Minnesota without reference
to GPS, Google Earth, or a formal survey. If landowners and lawyers
are going to innovate their way out of this issue, it is still a long way
off.
Of course, practitioners who have taken the time to read this
article can and should use it to the present benefit of their clients.
Landowners should be advised to ascertain and enforce the surveyed
boundaries of their land, and for particularly risk-averse property
owners, registration under the Torrens Act may be appropriate.181 If
others are using portions of a client’s land, the client should ensure
that it is understood and well-documented that such use is
permissive. Whenever a landowner contemplates acquiring a new
piece of property, candid advice should be liberally provided about
the potential risks associated with adverse possession. And if an
agricultural client bothers to consult her lawyer before constructing
a new fence, consider advising her to put in a little forethought and
a little money now to help avoid what could become a big problem
down the road. An adverse possession claim related to a fence might

180. See Gil Gullickson, Precision Farming Can Better Target Inputs for Higher Yields,
SUCCESSFUL
FARMING
AT
AGRICULTURE.COM
(Nov.
18,
2016),
http://www.agriculture.com/crops/corn/precision-farming-can-better-target
-inputs-for-higher-yields.
181. See MINN. STAT. § 508.02 (2016) (“No title to registered land in derogation
of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or by adverse
possession, but the common law doctrine of practical location of boundaries applies
to registered land whenever registered.”); see also Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes, 744
N.W.2d 226, 232 (Minn. 2008) (“[A]cquisition by adverse possession is specifically
disallowed by the Torrens Act [for properties properly registered under the Act].”).
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arise, at the earliest, fifteen years from its construction. It is hard to
plan that far into the future. But the cost of using technological and
legal means to ensure that a new fence is, depending on the purpose
of the fence, actually on or not actually on the property line could
easily be built into the construction costs. Amortized over the useful
life of the fence, the risk-avoidance cost for doing the construction
right in the first place would be a pittance.
With the right cases, the judiciary could also assist lawyers and
their clients in clarifying some of the points raised in the Kozak cases.
Adding a greater degree of certainty to the law might prevent a
number of these cases from being brought in the first place or, at
least, might spur more rapid resolutions. If it comes before them
again, Minnesota appellate courts should join their sister
jurisdictions in determining unequivocally whether or not pasturing
livestock constitutes sufficient possession to sustain an adverse
possession claim.182 Minnesota courts could also decide whether
hunting constitutes sufficient possession to sustain an adverse
possession claim; if there are any Minnesota judges reading this, they
are urged to join their colleagues across the St. Croix River in
holding that it does not.183 There are plenty of hunting-related
boundary conflicts in rural Minnesota as it is.
Ultimately, the main thematic element of this article is in the
hands of the judiciary. Minnesota courts could, and should, hold
emphatically and unambiguously what most of them seem to have
been at least toying at for years: that the mere existence of a fence is
of no use in an adverse possession claim.
Of course, the legislature could also act to alter the law of
adverse possession. One suggestion that has been gaining steam is to
eliminate it altogether.184 Although impassioned arguments exist for
182. See Weis v. Kozak, 410 N.W.2d 903, 906 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (“A number
of jurisdictions have held that pasturing livestock is sufficient possession to meet the
requirements of adverse possession . . . . In the other states that have considered the
question, the result depends upon the surrounding circumstances.”); supra note 72
and accompanying text (citing Weis, 410 N.W.2d at 906).
183. See, e.g., Peter H. & Barbara J. Steuck Living Tr. v. Easley, 785 N.W.2d 631,
635 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals offered a well-reasoned
opinion in Easley as to why the nature of hunting renders hunting an activity that
generally cannot meet the elements of adverse possession; that analysis will not be
repeated here, but is certainly worth a look for anyone with intellectual curiosity on
the point. See id.
184. Wisconsin’s 2015 Senate Bill 344 proposed eliminating adverse possession
with two exceptions: “1) [if] a court is unable to identify or locate the record title
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the retention of adverse possession,185 perhaps it is a doctrine that
has outlived its usefulness and, indeed, its former romanticism. More
than a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes, a favorite of this author,
wrote in defense of adverse possession:
A thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for
a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in
your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting
the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by
it. The law can ask no better justification than the deepest
instincts of man. It is only by way of reply to the suggestion
that you are disappointing the former owner, that you refer
to his neglect having allowed the gradual dissociation
between himself and what he claims, and the gradual
association of it with another. If he knows that another is
doing acts which on their face show that he is on the way
toward establishing such an association, I should argue that
in justice to that other he was bound at his peril to find out
whether the other was acting under his permission, to see
that he was warned, and, if necessary, stopped.186
Perhaps Holmes’ lyrical prose captured the essence of the
doctrine in a time in which coaxing a hardscrabble life from the dirt
was the norm. Maybe he even spoke to the circumstances of a
fourteen-year-old farm boy in the 1970s, building a fence by hand,
alongside his father. But in an age of corporate farming, in which
everyone carries around in their pockets tools capable of precision
mapmaking, and globalization has set young people adrift from the
family farm on the winds of mobility, the justifications for preserving
the doctrine for the individual adverse claimant working the land no
longer seem so at home. Perhaps the time is drawing near to declare
that the property line is just the surveyed property line, although
such a declaration would be purchased at the price of a tinge of
nostalgia from this author. For the most part, the prospect of
abandoning adverse possession is merely food for thought and is
beyond the scope of this article. But it does make one wonder what
the next generation of Kozaks might be fighting about.
owner or the record title owner’s successor in interest; or 2) [if] a principal building
has been located on the real property for at least the required number of years of
uninterrupted adverse possession.” S.B. No. 344, 102d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2015).
185. See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J.
2419 (2001), http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/221.
186. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477
(1897).
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VI. CONCLUSION
There is no crisis around agricultural fence lines in adverse
possession claims. It is not something that desperately demands
congressional action or calls for the immediate resolution of a circuit
split. It is an obscure subject matter, albeit one that could use a few
tweaks in the courts. But it is a topic that can be important to the
lives of real people. It is a topic that a lawyer practicing in agricultural
law should at least be aware of. For the Kozak family in particular, it
inhabits a distinct corner of Minnesota law over which they can claim
a certain degree of ownership. Our legal system requires a real life
controversy to test the boundaries of the law, hone its concepts, and
at times, expose its absurdities. When Harry Kozak agreed to build a
crooked fence with his neighbor in the 1960s, he probably never
imagined a lawyer would be writing about it in 2016. But that
crooked fence probably allowed his direct descendants to resolve a
controversy a lot more expediently than would have otherwise been
possible. It helped provide legal clarity and direction for dozens of
similarly situated landowners who found themselves in personally
troubling situations. That legacy is deserving of pride. And whatever
precedential echo continues to pulsate forward in time, for the
Kozaks and for all future Minnesota farmers, a part of it all started
with a man named Harry, who wanted to build a fence.
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